2013年6月15日星期六

杜浩成對社運人士有沒有偏見?

這一篇是因應上一篇山中的留言及梁國雄對杜浩成的批評而寫。山中這樣講:

montwithin2013年6月15日 上午9:44

The reason I asked you to write about it was because of this: "未必所有遊行人士都認同侮辱區旗的行為,假如沒有區旗法的保護,侮辱區旗更可能破壞社會秩序和引起衝突". That statement devoid any legal substance, logic, and common sense that I know of. I am inclined to agree that this judge is biased.

長毛這樣講:

到庭聲援的立法會議員梁國雄批評杜浩成的判決有政治偏見兼「智力低下」,不適合再處理牽涉政治及人權的案件,他會去信首席法官馬道立反映。(14.6.2013 東方日報)

梁國雄指杜浩成「智力低下」當然是氣話,而且也有點危險,雖然市民有批評公職人員 (法官屬公職人員) 的自由,這是民主社會言論自由的基本權利,但並非毫無限制的,不斷無理攻擊法官,足以構成藐視法庭罪,東方報業集團總編輯黃陽午那4個月監,就是這樣而來。梁國雄可以批評杜浩成對社運人士判刑嚴苛,但不能講「智力低下」。事實上杜浩成智力毫無問題。我不是講所有法官都沒有智力問題,有的智力和能力都有問題,要認真批評就要拿證據出來講,攻擊智力只是煽情話。寫信給首席法官馬道立反映,也沒有作用。馬道立不會干擾個別法官的審案判決,否則會變成干擾司法獨立。對法官不當言行,可以投訴,對法官判決有任何不滿,麼該上訴,循正常法律程序處理。

那麼,在古思堯、馬雲祺焚燒區旗案,杜浩成的判決有沒有偏頗呢?以定罪而言,辯方並沒有具體抗辯理據,講來講去只有犯案動機這一點,我相信任何法官都會不考慮犯案動機,判被告有罪。山中大概為了「假如沒有區旗法的保護,侮辱區旗更可能破壞社會秩序和引起衝 突」這說話,而感到杜浩成的判決理據有問題,所以偏頗。我們在侮辱國旗區旗之二 一文的留言有頗多的討論,杜浩成的講法似乎把侮辱區旗罪跟公眾地方內擾亂秩序行為罪 (Disorderly Conduct) 混為一談。「可能破壞社會秩序和引起衝突」並非侮辱區旗罪的元素,也不是終審法院在吳恭劭案的討論,我反而覺得有點紐西蘭警察的味道。紐西蘭的 Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704一案,最高法院推翻Hopkinson侮辱區旗罪的定罪,認為法例牴觸紐西蘭人權法賦予公民的表達自由,紐西蘭警方自此之後對焚燒國旗的人控以Offensive Behaviour (The Queen v Valerie Morse [2009] NZCA 623) 。這種思維,跟杜浩成有點不謀而合。可是,就算這樣思考,也不能說他偏頗。

梁國雄對杜浩成的批評,主要是因為判刑前收押19歲初犯的馬雲祺。除非有證據顯示杜浩成對民主派嚴厲,對建制派寬宏,否則不能講杜浩成對社運人士有偏見,只能說他對某些行為判刑嚴苛。他心目中有判監打算,才會收押馬雲祺,先索取報告,才考慮實際判法。杜浩成這樣做是按法例規定做,法例第221章《刑事訴訟程序條例》第109A條對監禁年齡在16至21歲之間的人的限制這樣講:

少年罪犯的監禁

(1) 對任何年屆16歲或超過16歲而未屆21歲的人,法庭除非認為沒有其他適當的方法可處置該人,否則不得判處監禁;就決定任何其他處置該人的方法是否適當而言,法庭須取得和考慮有關情況的資料,並須顧及在法庭席前的任何關於該人的品格與其健康及精神狀況的資料。

19歲的馬雲祺在這年齡之內,不能未索報告考慮其他適當的處置方法之前就直接判監。如果杜浩成不打算判馬雲祺坐監,當作別論。故此,單獨為了收押馬雲祺而批評杜浩成具政治偏見,這批評不公允。

那麼,非判監不可以嗎?當然可以。杜浩成依賴的是香港特別行政區 訴 古思堯 HCMA185/2013一案。這是唯一有關侮辱國旗區旗的判刑上訴案例,也是我多次批評李柱銘資深大律師未為古思堯作最好判刑争辯的案。這件案並非判刑指引的案件,因為判辭並沒有深入討論及建議不同情況侮辱國旗區旗的判法,只圍繞怎樣對古思堯判刑,杜浩成確實無需跟隨。而且聽審上訴的張慧玲法官只跟從該案原審裁判官覃有方的思路來判決,把焚燒國旗區旗視作加重刑罰的因素,杜浩成也從這方向想,歸根究底就是李柱銘上訴争辯不力的責任。

我講過很多次,焚燒國旗區旗的危險很低,警察拿着滅火筒在場隨時滅火,比起盂蘭燒衣,中秋煲蠟,演唱會放煙花的風險更低,不應該視為加刑因素(aggravating factor)。侮辱區旗的管制來自文件編號A602《區旗及區徽條例》第7條:

任何人公開及故意以焚燒、毀損、塗劃、玷污、踐踏等方式侮辱區旗或區徽,即屬犯罪─

不論那種方式的侮辱,像徵意義大過實際的効力,列出幾種侮辱方式,目的是函蓋不同情況及方式的侮辱,並無凸顯嚴重性。玷污和踐踏,你可以講得出那種方式更嚴重嗎?寫上打倒共產黨和畫隻烏龜上去,那個較嚴重?在我看都是symbolic,根本無分別。因為焚燒就必然會危險是非常牽強的講法,然則示威者叫糾察隊圍圈拿着滅火筒戒避就可以消除這加刑因素嗎?想起都有點荒謬。今天的事都是抗辯失策的漣漪効應,這團律師為甚麼不出來跟我辯論,讓我知道究竟我是否評論得不公允呢?

我預了山中會反駁我一些論述,就算我很多時候都贊同他的看法,有異議的時候,我們都坦誠表達,儘管大家在網上神交已久,都不會迴避看法,我這一次不贊同他批評杜浩成biased的看法。山中和我都是獨立bloggers,不管是誰,看不過眼就駡,不像民主之神之父之妖之棍之類,Snowden事件立即隱身潛水,往地洞裏鑽,不哼一聲。Snowden事件是一面照妖鏡,照出美國佬的偽善,也照出大聲疾呼,口吐白沫,鏗鏘嚮亮高呼民主人權的人,那塊掛在臉上的面具。






16 則留言:

  1. 杜官唔係話「焚燒」就係加刑因素,而係以下兩點才是加刑因素:

    1. other unknown person 圍住佢地,阻警察搶火機,所以係同佢地有「jointenterprise」,要加刑

    2. 點報紙"喇"到一個男人隻手,令佢可能受傷,所以被告要負責

    不過佢係在verdict時問辯方呢兩點點睇,杜未話一定會因為咁而加刑,要睇佢sentence會否咁講
    http://news.sina.com.hk/news/20130614/-5-2992889/1.html

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    1. Thanks. It may be premature to say what are the aggravating factors in this case until we see how Joseph To sentences the defendants and what he says in the statement of findings on appeal..

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  2. To have constructive and friendly debates is one of the reason I write my blog. I don't have time today; I will do some research and come back to you later.

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    1. Take your time. Nothing urgent. In the end you may agree with me.

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    2. I haven't read the New Zeland cases in detail, so I won't comment on the finer points. The problem is that the judge cannot mix the charges together and should consider them separately. Is it a desecration of symbols or is it an act that is disturbing the peace? If it is the latter, then the desecration of the symbols can, in fact, fall under the protection of free expression; if it is the former than it is redundant to mention the latter because the laws regarding the symbols have stipulated their own sets of punishments.

      Regarding his legal reasoning, when any act, desecrating the flags or not, causes a disturb of the peace, the law can act on it based on this act alone. It is the fact that an act causes disorder that excludes it from the protection of free expression. The judge should not make a conjecture suggesting the desecration of flags is likely to disrupt the peace. This is a postulation that exists only in his mind. Furthermore, he was not there to make judgment on that point; the fact the protest didn't cause any confrontation is evidence enough against his assertion.

      Anyway, will come back after reading the cases. To make light of a serious topic, here is a clip of Penn & Teller burning the American flag.

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    3. To be fair to Joseph To, I think he is trying to say the restriction on freedom of expression and it is necessary to impose restriction because of public order concern. We have to see what he has written when this case has gone on appeal.

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    4. I agree that there can and should be restrictions, but the restrictions have to be placed upon real and existing threats that compromise public order. A good example is hate crimes, where the offender incites violent actions against a particular group of people. Burning flags, as you suggested above, is not a big public security concern.

      The Queen v Valerie Morse is about the disruption of a public memorial service to commemorate fallen soldiers. In that case it can be argued that the offender was duly convicted on account of her disorderly behaviors, or specifically, actions with the intent to disturb the public order based on that particular situation/environment. The question is about the effect of her action (based on evidence on the likeness of a breach of the peace), not whether a flag was burnt. The court in this case based its decision on the former question. It made a judgment based on the context ("But at this point the context becomes important" para. 34).

      I would further add that people do not have the rights not to be offended; that's part of the deal with free speech. It isn't a crime if one were to say Jews are stupid, but it is a crime if one were to say Jews are parasites and they should be rid off this world. The latter encompass a threat of violence.

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    5. I should point out, in the end Valerie Morse's conviction was overturned in the Supreme Court (like our CFA) on point of law which has no direct connection with the burning of flag itself. In the HK scenario, I can only think of a possible attempt to appeal to CFA to bring in the NZ Hopkinson case to argue again on the breach of freedom of expression argument. The Hopkinson case was adjugded after Ng Kung Siu.

      The Jews example you gave (Jews are stupid) may amount to racial vilification depending on where and how you say it. It may end up in a civil claim in the District Court.

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    6. I found the reasons to upheld Morse's conviction in the appellate court shaky. She did not cause any physical damage and the "disruption" did not amount to a crime. The court tried to pin it on her "intention to make maximum impact", well, that's what protest is all about. The court also said that her action caused "anger and outrage", which is any citizen's right provide that she didn't intent to provoke violent reactions. In any case, convicted or not, Morse could not have received an imprisonment sentence. So, setting the issue of the flag aside, I think it is clear that a person cannot be imprisoned without causing serous physical harms.

      Interestingly, I thought of the point of provocation before I read the NZ Supreme Court judgment: "[the legislators] make it clear they are concerned, not with the protection of individuals from upset, but rather with ―the protection of the public from disorder calculated to interfere with the public’s normal activities" (para. 3), and, "unless behaviour is disruptive or provocative of disruption of public order, objectively assessed, it is neither "disorderly" nor "offensive" (para. 7). The SC clearly stated that the law does not protect anyone from being offended.

      I'm not sure if arguments similar to the above had been made in HK courts. When I read Ng Kung Siu, I could only see the CFA giving a very brief tautological argument on necessity and proportionality. Their argument basically amounts to: since the lawgiver deemed it necessary, then it must be necessary, and since it is necessary, then it must be proportional. They did not consider the issues about the form or the letters of the law and the impacts of the law, and they clearly wanted to upheld the form.

      It's good to talk like this.

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    7. We will be seeing a similar appeal in HK when the Court of Final Appeal is to decide on the "microphone" snatching case in due course. We will then see how the Court of Final Appeal interprets the "disruption" and "provoking the public feeling" aspect of the charge of Disorderly Conduct.

      Interpretation of the law is not scientific. It is an objective-subjective path of thinking involving personal value judgement and empirical experience. There is no absolute right or wrong. There is only a hierarchical structure to decide who is superior and who can overrule decisions. It is what is called stare decisis.

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  3. 標少, 如果下次古先生將一面區旗顯示在一個平板電腦上, 而他將那平板電腦燒掉, 那會否侮辱區旗?

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    1. A computer is a computer. It is not a flag. So the desecration of regional flag cannot be resulted for burning the computer.

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  4. 梁國雄指杜浩成「智力低下」當然是氣話,而且也有點危險,雖然市民有批評公職人員 (法官屬公職人員) 的自由,這是民主社會言論自由的基本權利,但並非毫無限制的,不斷無理攻擊法官,足以構成藐視法庭罪,東方報業集團總編輯黃陽午那4個月監,就是這樣而來。梁國雄可以批評杜浩成對社運人士判刑嚴苛,但不能講「智力低下」。

    碰巧看到這一段,我想說的是,長毛是在庭外罵杜官,並無藐視法庭的危險,因為裁判官沒有inherent jurisdiction判人藐視法庭,只有statutory power罰人侮辱法庭.Correct me if I'm wrong.

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  5. 裁判官沒有inherent jurisdiction, 只有statutory power當然是事實,侮辱裁判官而裁判官有權處理的法律權力來自S.99, Cap. 227,庭裏庭外的侮辱同可引用。

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  6. 若引用s.99控告庭外的侮辱法庭,便須找人證明某人說過侮辱裁判官的說話,或者若某人在電視鏡頭前侮辱裁判官,也可拿片段作證吧,但長毛不會在鏡頭前侮辱裁判官的.至今幾乎沒有一宗個案,是裁判官引用s.99,就庭外發生的侮辱事件作出追究的.

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  7. S.99多數用於在庭上的侮辱,裁判官可以簡易程序處理(即判),庭外的就要有人舉報,一般都不計較這些説話,所以沒有追究。黃陽午那件案有點不同,東方派狗仔隊跟Godfrey,又在報紙不斷辱罵,嚴重挑戰司法尊嚴。一般而言,香港法官比較寛宏。在悉尼一位裁判官因為報章批評她放掉所有原住民(aboriginals)的案件,她告人誹謗。可見香港的社會氣氛在這方面自由度大,也大得過火。

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